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Abstract
Economic performance has a well-known relationship to political trust. If  the 
economy is perceived as performing well, the levels of  political trust are likely to 
improve. During the 2008 economic crash in Iceland, this relationship seemed 
vindicated once more. Political trust in Iceland fell from very high to medium 
levels. Paradoxically, strong indicators of  good economic performance after the 
crash have not been reflected in similarly strong indicators of  greater political 
trust. Thus, while the economy has recovered, political trust has not followed 
suit to a comparable degree. To account for this discrepancy, we analyse the data 
on political trust in Iceland before and after the crash. Our findings indicate that 
while the economy is important in generating political trust, improved economic 
performance does not account for the whole scenario. The political impact of  
the crisis remains an obstacle to re-establishing political trust to previous levels, 
as identifying with a party in the government fails to contribute to political trust 
in the previous manner. Similarly, personal experience of  the crisis may have 
created a sense of  alienation among age cohorts that were particularly affected 
by the crash and the subsequent economic recession.
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financial crisis; economic crash; Iceland.
Icelandic Review of Politics and Administration. Vol. 14, Issue 1. Special issue on power and democracy in Iceland (211-234)
© 2018 Contact: Sjöfn Vilhelmsdóttir, sjofn@hi.is 
Article first published online May 31st 2018 on http://www.irpa.is
Publisher: Institute of Public Administration and Politics, Gimli, Sæmundargötu 1, 101 Reykjavík, Iceland
Stjórnmál & stjórnsýsla. 1. tbl. 14. árg. 2018. Sérhefti um vald og lýðræði á Íslandi (211-234) Fræðigreinar
© 2018 Tengiliður: Sjöfn Vilhelmsdóttir, sjofn@hi.is 
Vefbirting 31. maí 2018 - Birtist á vefnum http://www.irpa.is
Útgefandi: Stofnun stjórnsýslufræða og stjórnmála, Gimli, Sæmundargötu 1, 101 Reykjavík
DOI: https://doi.org/10.13177/irpa.a.2018.14.1.10




Political trust in Iceland: 
Performance or politics?
Introduction 
Countries that have experienced a major change in a short period of  time provide in-
teresting cases to study public attitudes towards the political system (Norris 2011). The 
2008 financial meltdown and its vast impact on Icelandic society make Iceland an in-
triguing case for the study on political trust. Icelanders refer to the fall of  the country’s 
three largest banks in the beginning of  October 2008 as the ‘crash’. In the years leading 
up to the crash, Icelanders had been enjoying political stability and strong economic 
growth, placing the country on the top of  the United Nations’ Human Development 
Index in 2007 (United Nations Development Programme 2007). Economists refer to 
Iceland’s financial and economic downturn in the last months of  2008 as the ‘collapse 
of  a country’, describing the deepest and most rapid financial crisis of  a country record-
ed in peacetime (Danielsson & Zoega 2009). It caused a wide range of  serious negative 
impacts, plunging the country into a severe economic recession and leading to social 
and political unrest in the following months and years (see, e.g., Bernburg 2016; Indriða-
son, Önnudóttir, Þórisdóttir & Harðarson 2017; Ólafsson, Kristjánsson & Stefánsson 
2012a, 2012b). This disturbance found immediate expression in the 2009 election when 
the politicians those considered responsible for the crisis suffered heavily (Indriðason 
2014). The dramatic developments following the crash also caused substantial changes 
in Icelanders’ trust in political and public institutions. Gallup’s annual public trust survey 
in February 2008 showed that 43% of  the respondents reported ‘a lot’ or ‘a great deal’ 
of  trust in the national parliament Alþingi and 40% in the country’s banking system. A 
year later, four months after the financial meltdown in the beginning of  October 2008, 
only 13% of  the respondents expressed trust in the parliament and a mere 4% in the 
banking system (Gallup n.d.). Evidence from other European countries that were most 
exposed to the financial crisis, such as Greece, Cyprus, Portugal, Spain and Ireland, 
showed a similar trend – a drastic decline in citizens’ trust in national governmental insti-
tutions (see Armingeon & Guthmann 2014; Roth, Nowak-Lehmann & Otter 2011; van 
Erkel & van der Meer 2016). The distinct impact of  the financial crisis on political trust 
levels across Europe support the claim that economic performance can be regarded as 
a key source of  political trust. Nonetheless, through a combination of  luck and effort, 
Iceland’s economic system not only survived the crash but actually entered a phase of  
rapid expansion with economic growth and full employment. In 2017, nine years after 
the crash, Icelanders enjoyed economic conditions, in terms of  gross domestic product 
per capita, that were better than pre-crisis levels (OECD 2017). However, in Gallup’s 
(n.d.) annual trust survey that year, only 22% of  the respondents expressed trust in the 
parliament, still far off  from pre-crash trust levels. Thus, even if  negative evaluations of  
policy performance appear to have brought on lower levels of  confidence in the parlia-
ment, the post-crisis boom has so far been insufficient in restoring trust to its former 
levels.
Lower levels of  political trust in Iceland after the 2008 economic crash have been 
at the centre of  public debate. The crash was followed by increasing electoral volatil-






prevailed since the early 1990s. While the economy started to show signs of  recovery 
by 2011, followed by a strong economic growth (Statistics Iceland n.d.), political insta-
bility remained a problem. To radical reformers, lower levels of  political trust indicate 
the need for far-reaching constitutional reforms, while to incremental reformers, such 
levels underline the need for a return to normal politics and political stability. Successive 
governments after the crash have pointed to the continuously improving economic con-
dition as an indicator of  their trustworthiness, but voters do not appear to be in a trust-
ing mood regarding political representation. The crash was followed by calls for several 
representative reforms, which would have reduced the role of  the conventional parlia-
mentary party government and instigated greater measures for personalised voting, a 
stronger role for the president, a more active parliament and direct democracy. Some 
of  these demands found expression in a failed constitutional bill, which to some extent, 
remains at the centre of  the controversy concerning representative reforms. Adherents 
of  representative reforms perceive them as the keys to greater confidence. Critics view 
them as potential threats to a stable government. 
In this paper, our task is to unravel the apparent paradox of  political trust in Iceland. 
Specifically, while the economic crash was clearly instrumental in undermining trust, the 
economic recovery has not brought with it a corresponding return to previous levels of  
trust. After discussing the relevance and the conceptualisation of  political trust, we de-
velop theoretical expectations concerning the probable influencing factors. To address 
the trust issues in Iceland, we develop expectations on the basis of  two important re-
search traditions. On one hand, political trust is produced by strong policy performance, 
for example, regarding the economy. On the other hand, political trust is generated by 
attachment to and identification with important political actors, such as political parties. 
From this perspective, identification with a political party in the parliamentary majority 
should enhance political trust. We then analyse the European Social Survey (ESS) data 
from three points in time, prior to the crash (2004), a few years after the crash (2012) 
and after the economic recovery (2016), to test our expectations.
1. The concept of political trust
Political trust is closely related to other positive terms that are used to describe citizens’ 
orientations towards their political system, such as support, political allegiance, commit-
ment and legitimacy (Citrin & Muste 1993). Its opposites that belong to the same family 
of  concepts include political alienation, disaffection and estrangement. The implication 
is that greater popular trust and support enable governments to function more effec-
tively. Listhaug and Ringdal (2008) emphasise the positive relationship between high 
levels of  political trust and economic and social development. In fact, they regard high 
levels of  political trust, such as in the Nordic countries, “as a success criterion for socie-
ties” (p. 131).
While the literature suggests that political trust is a key element in the workings of  
democracy, the notion of  political trust remains contested (Hooghe & Zmerli 2011). 




Political trust in Iceland: 
Performance or politics?
and theories and assumptions about it are tangled and complex” (p. 242). In the social 
science literature, trust is conceptualised as both a rational assessment and an affective 
feeling that has different implications for social inquiry (Coleman 1988; Fukuyama 1995; 
Hardin 2002; Maloy 2009; Offe 1999; Uslaner 2002). Scholars who conceptualise politi-
cal trust as a rational notion focus on the perceived qualities of  the trustees – the insti-
tutions and the actors in the political system. Political trust is generated when citizens 
perceive (according to their cognitive-based judgements) the political system as taking 
care of  their interests, governing effectively and producing desirable outcomes (Citrin 
1974; Hetherington 1998; Levi 2003; Miller & Listhaug 1999; Newton 2008).
Scholars who conceptualise political trust as an affective feeling hold the view that 
another kind of  trust is based on a moral commitment or a social norm to be trustwor-
thy (Offe 1999; Putnam 1993, 2000). For this kind of  trust, the inquiry on trust relations 
focuses on the truster, specifically on the characteristics of  the person expressing trust. 
Here, trust is built through socialisation, resulting in affective feelings and identification 
with the institutions of  the political system. According to Campbell et al. (1964), indi-
viduals develop partisan self-identities at an early age and tend to interpret information 
received later in life as reinforcements of  earlier attachments. Almond and Verba (1989) 
likewise argue that political trust is generated through socialisation, where affective feel-
ings towards the political system contribute to the creation of  favourable conditions 
for democratic government. In their notion of  civic culture, political attitudes, such 
as political trust, are enduring and stable traits of  society and become part of  the na-
tional culture. They are affective feelings, learned and transmitted through generations 
via socialisation, functioning as an attitudinal base for the existing political institutions. 
Rose and Mishler (2011) suggest that the culture-based notion of  trust as an affective 
orientation and the institution-based idea of  trust as an evaluative orientation should not 
necessarily be considered in conflict. Trust or distrust can be learned through early-life 
socialisation and relearned later in life based on actual experience in dealing with politi-
cal institutions.
Whether trust is based on affective or evaluative considerations is not crucial for its 
measurement. It can be measured by using questionnaire items that estimate confidence 
in politicians and political institutions. Concretely, it means confidence that desired out-
comes will occur through the agency of  a political actor. It may be misplaced, misin-
formed or based entirely on affective factors. It may equally well be evaluative and based 
on cold calculations. Whatever the case, the trusting respondent will express confidence 
in political institutions and actors. 
Scholars have referred to Easton’s (1965, 1975) analytical description of  system 
support to cater to citizens’ orientation towards office holders, as well as detect the 
underlying institutional legitimacy of  the political system. Easton makes an important 
distinction between diffuse and specific classes of  political support when analysing over-
all support for the political system. Diffuse support represents citizens’ perception that 
the political system’s existence, principles and functioning reflect their own values and 






of  the political system, specifically the incumbent authorities. Moreover, citizens can 
have different sentiments towards various objects of  political support; an individual 
may hold negative views of  the political authorities while expressing confidence in the 
regime’s institutions and support for its principles. The most extensive research projects 
on political trust have been undertaken in the context of  Easton’s notion of  system sup-
port – conceptualising political trust as a multidimensional notion and analysing citizens’ 
orientations towards different aspects of  the political system as part of  an overall assess-
ment of  system support (Dalton 2004; Norris 1999, 2011).
The Icelandic experience demonstrates the usefulness of  making a distinction among 
different levels of  trust and in various types of  institutions. Kristinsson and Vilhelms-
dóttir’s (2015) review of  political trust measures from 1984 to the 2008 financial crash 
showed that Iceland followed the Nordic trend, with high levels of  support for demo-
cratic principles and confidence in core regime institutions, including the parliament, 
civil service, the justice system and the police (Table 1 shows the confidence levels). 
Hence, Iceland was one of  the high-trusting countries, a term often used for the Nordic 
countries in cross-national studies (Klingemann 1999; Marien 2011a; Norris 2011).  
Table 1. Confidence in the parliament, civil service, the justice system and the 
police in Iceland from a comparative perspective1 
EVS waves Net 
change
Net 












 Iceland 56% 54% 72% 40% -16 -33
 Other Nordic countries: average 52% 46% 47% 60% 8 13
 EVS average 48% 43% 36% 40%
Confidence in civil service 
 Iceland 48% 46% 56% 61% 13 5
 Other Nordic countries: average 51% 43% 48% 55% 4 8
 EVS average 48% 42% 41% 48%
Confidence in the justice system
 Iceland 69% 67% 74% 68% -1 -6
 Other Nordic countries: average 79% 69% 69% 77% -2 8
 EVS average 63% 52% 46% 49%
Confidence in the police
 Iceland 74% 84% 83% 93% 19 10
 Other Nordic countries: average 85% 82% 85% 86% 1 1
 EVS average 75% 60% 57% 63%
Note. Questions: How much confidence do you have in civil service/the justice system/the police? Is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much 
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As presented in Table 1, the European Value Study (EVS) data collected in Iceland 
from 2009 to 2010 (9–15 months after the financial crash in October 2008) showed that 
the citizens continued to be highly trusting towards their civil service and the police, 
while exhibiting a stable and relatively high confidence in the justice system. In contrast, 
there was a sharp fall in public confidence in the parliament. The proportion of  Iceland-
ers who trusted the parliament ‘a great deal’ or ‘quite a lot’ decreased from a uniquely 
high 72% at the turn of  the 21st century to 40% in 2009–2010, while trust in the other 
Nordic parliaments over the same period rose from 47% to 60%. The Icelandic EVS 
data indicated two trends. First, the impact of  the economic crash on political trust was 
concentrated on the representational side rather than the implementation side of  the 
political system. This is in line with Önnudóttir and Hardarson’s (2011) finding that the 
crash had a highly negative effect on Icelandic voters’ satisfaction with how democracy 
worked. Second, as argued by Kristinsson and Vilhelmsdóttir (2015), the decline in polit-
ical trust levels in Iceland following the crash should be viewed as a decrease in specific 
support rather than a legitimacy crisis. It seemed that the Icelandic public blamed the 
politicians for the crash and the ensuing economic hardship yet expressed confidence in 
regime institutions other than the parliament and strong diffuse support (to use Easton’s 
terminology) for the political system.
Complementary findings emerged from other Icelandic studies on political trust in 
the aftermath of  the 2008 crash. In 2013, the Institute of  Social Science Research, Uni-
versity of  Iceland conducted a study on public trust in the national parliament Alþingi, 
using survey and focus group methods. The study’s findings were decisive; only 13% of  
the respondents expressed trust in Alþingi, while 60% reported that they had rather lit-
tle or very little trust in the national parliament. When asked for the reason(s) for their 
distrust, the majority of  the participants replied that their distrust was directed towards 
the members of  parliament (MPs) rather than the parliament itself. The participants 
believed that the MPs were not performing their work in accordance with the public’s 
expectations regarding standards of  behaviour in conducting parliamentary procedures 
and standards of  efficiency in dealing with the severe problems facing the nation in the 
aftermath of  the financial crash. 
In his study on trust in crisis, Bjarnason (2014) used Gallup’s 2012 survey data to 
examine public trust in four political and public institutions in Iceland: the national 
parliament, the police, the president/presidency and politicians. The study clearly dem-
onstrated the growing gap in the levels of  trust in different institutions in the post-2008 
era. While the measured levels of  trust in the police and the president were 85% and 
53%, respectively, only 11% of  the respondents expressed trust in the parliament and 
7% in politicians. Bjarnason identified different trends in political trust attitudes based 
on the respondents’ socioeconomic backgrounds and political party affiliations. The 
respondents who expressed trust in the parliament tended to have higher educational at-
tainment, were less likely to have experienced personal financial problems and reported 
support for the parties of  the coalition government. In contrast, the respondents who 






financial problems and reported support for the opposition parties in the parliament. 
From a broad perspective, we expect trust to be influenced by relatively objective fac-
tors associated with government performance and/or more subjective predispositions 
that are likely to affect evaluations of  the government and its performance. Objective 
factors include the government’s success in promoting economic growth or prevent-
ing unemployment but may be biased by personal experience and expectations as well. 
Subjective predispositions comprise the values, norms and identities that affect people’s 
propensity to trust, to some extent irrespective of  the government’s actual performance. 
The two factors – performance and predispositions – are not mutually exclusive ac-
counts of  political trust. Indeed, they may be mutually reinforcing but are not the same, 
as discussed in the next section. 
2. Government performance and political trust
The literature and empirical research on political trust have always emphasised the role 
of  government performance in generating political trust and support (Bok 1997; Citrin 
1974; Easton 1965; Miller & Listhaug 1999; Polavieja 2013; van Erkel & van der Meer 
2016). Since the Second World War, governments have been assumed responsibility for 
the performance of  their economies. As Listhaug and Wiberg (1995) point out, with 
the expansion of  governments’ economic role across public institutions, “it is likely 
that mass support for public institutions—parliament included—becomes increasingly 
sensitive to performance evaluations” (p. 301). In countries with an extensive public 
welfare system, public access to healthcare services, education and social security can 
also be considered government performance indicators (Kumlin 2011). Nonetheless, 
economic performance is a key variable explaining trust in the government (Lawrence 
1997). The economic performance indicators include a country’s gross national income 
and economic growth, as well as inflation and unemployment rates. 
However, empirical evidence for the relationship between macroeconomic condi-
tions and political trust has been mixed, especially when analysing long-term trends 
(Bok 1997; Dalton 2004, van der Meer & Dekker 2011; van Erkel & van der Meer 
2016). Dalton (2004) notes that the long decline in political trust and support in many 
advanced industrial countries over the last few decades does not match their economic 
performance. Nye (1997) explains that there is some ambiguity regarding the link be-
tween measures of  performance and measures of  public trust in the government. First, 
when citizens express dissatisfaction with their government’s performance, it raises the 
following questions: What is performance compared with? Is it compared with citizens’ 
expectations? Is it compared with the government’s past performance or with those of  
other nations? Van der Meer (2017) points out that the inconsistency in the effect of  
actual macroeconomic performance on political trust may be due to the methodological 
set-up of  trust research. The most prominent studies on political trust are based on a 
cross-national comparison using survey data, where cross-national differences in trust 
are explained by cross-national differences in government performance. This set-up 
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the economic performance of  other countries” (p. 279). Van der Meer (2017) suggests 
that a longitudinal comparison rather than a cross-national one would be more useful to 
test the effect of  macroeconomic performance. The reason is that survey respondents 
are more likely to base their assessments of  current economic performance on the past 
experience of  their own country rather than the performance of  other countries. Focus-
ing on within-country longitudinal changes in economic performance in 15 European 
Union countries, van Erkel and van der Meer (2016) find that macroeconomic perfor-
mance has an impact on political trust levels. 
The relationship between macroeconomic performance and political trust may thus 
be more indirect and often mediated at the micro-level through citizens’ perceptions of  
the economic circumstances. In their cross-national study on objective and subjective 
determinants of  political trust, van der Meer and Dekker (2011) show that subjective 
perceptions of  economic performance are the strongest determinants of  political trust, 
while the contextual effect of  economic development (the actual performance) has no 
significant impact on the trust variable. Studies based on American and European data 
show that the relationship between trust and prospective perceptions of  the national 
economy is much stronger than between trust and the economic situation of  an individ-
ual’s own family (Bok 1997; Dalton 2004). These findings suggest that citizens hold their 
government more accountable for the national economy than their personal finances. 
A similar trend has been observed in Europe during the period of  economic recession 
and austerity measures following the 2008 financial crisis (Armingeon & Guthmann 
2014; Polavieja 2013). In his study comparing survey responses in 2004 (pre-crisis) and 
in 2010 across 19 European countries, Polavieja (2013) observes a parallel trend between 
decreasing levels of  political trust and increasing average levels of  dissatisfaction with 
the economic situations of  the countries. His findings suggest that not only citizens 
who have been directly harmed by the deteriorating economic conditions have become 
less trusting towards their government but also those who have not directly experienced 
economic hardship.
Based on these results, we should expect the state of  the economy to be an impor-
tant predictor of  how political trust has developed in Iceland. Personal experience is 
not a necessary condition for positive general evaluations but may bolster their effects. 
3. Predispositions and political trust
In representative democracies, parties and elections create a linkage between citizens 
and elites, and political trust levels are believed to provide an indication of  the quality 
of  this linkage (Marien 2011b). The political trust literature and empirical research indi-
cate that citizens who support the parties forming the majority in the government (the 
‘winners’) express more political trust than those identifying with the parties comprising 
the minority in the parliament (the ‘losers’) (Anderson & Tverdova 2001; Dalton 2004; 
Holmberg 1999). Thus, when the political parties forming the government enjoy a large 
and solid support base, it is believed to have an enhancing effect on political trust. Elec-






the voters’ interest in political decision making; the structures of  democratic elections 
are designed to produce winners and losers in elections. As Listhaug and Ringdal (2008) 
note, it is ‘quite normal’ for citizens who vote for the parties that lose elections to be-
come less trusting towards the political system. Holmberg (1999) calls this effect of  
elections on political trust the ‘home-team hypothesis’, referring to how voters sympa-
thise with the political party/parties in the government if  they vote for any of  them or 
identify with them.
One of  the mechanisms affecting this relationship may be different policy prefer-
ences (Miller 1974; Miller & Listhaug 1998). According to this view, political distrust 
and cynicism develop among citizens who prefer policy positions that differ from those 
implemented by the government/political parties in power. Similarly, when the political 
agenda expands and/or becomes fragmented, it becomes difficult, if  not impossible, 
for the government to maximise voter satisfaction, creating volatility in electoral politics 
and causing more public dissatisfaction with the political process (Dalton 2004). Dalton 
points out that this development has occurred in advanced industrial democracies over 
the past several decades; we have observed the emergence of  policy preferences across 
multiple-issue dimensions with new concerns, such as environmental quality, gender and 
minority rights, and cultural issues. The governments in these countries are asked to per-
form more functions than before, creating policy fragmentation. Dalton (2004) calls it a 
‘multidimensional policy space’, which has led to a situation where the “government can 
satisfy most people some of  the time, or some people most of  the time, but not most of  
the people most of  the time” (p. 146). Dalton’s conclusion is that the expansion of  pol-
icy goals and the complexity of  the policy space have created new volatility in electoral 
politics and caused more public dissatisfaction with the political process, resulting in a 
gradual erosion of  political support and trust in many advanced industrial democracies. 
Hence, we expect political trust in Iceland to be strongly associated with support for 
parties in the government prior to the crash. Party identification was strong, as were the 
majorities behind the coalition government. In the subsequent period, there is greater 
room for doubt. As explained in the next section, the linkage function of  the political 
parties was in some ways weakened as a consequence of  the crash, with weaker party 
identification, vulnerable governments, a more fragmented party system and greater 
multidimensionality of  the political system. After the crash, support for the parties in 
the government is therefore less likely than before to contribute to political trust.
4. The context of political trust in Iceland
Before analysing the relationship with individual-level data, we can establish that a rough 
correspondence seems to exist between macro-level indicators and levels of  political 























1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2009 2013 2016
Figure 1. Trust in politicans 1983-2016 and gross national income per capita 
growth (five-year average %) in Iceland 1980-2015
Notes. Question: Do you think that politicians are generally trustworthy, many of  them are trustworthy, some are trustworthy, 
few or none are or is trustworthy? Figure entries are the percentages of  ‘generally trustworthy’ and ‘many of  them are 
trustworthy’. Sources: Icelandic National Election Study (ICENES), 1983–2016; Statistics Iceland (www.statice.is).
The data from the Icelandic National Election Study (ICENES) allows us to trace the 
trends in trust in Icelandic politicians over the 1983–2016 period. As Figure 1 indicates, 
there have been fluctuations. In 1983, 36% of  Icelandic citizens said that politicians 
were generally trustworthy, or at least, many of  them were. This number dropped to 
21% in 1991, started to rise and peaked in 2003 at 38%, only to fall again and take a 
sharp downturn from 2007 to 2009, when only 14% of  the respondents expressed trust 
in politicians. By 2013, trust was on the rise again, and in 2016, 23% expressed trust 
in politicians. Whereas trust in political actors tends to react easily to specific political 
events and short-term changes, no final conclusions should be drawn from the trends 
presented in Figure 1 without further analysis. Nevertheless, trust in politicians seems 
sensitive to the economic situation, as observed when comparing the two trend lines in 
Figure 1. Public trust in politicians remained fairly high during the relatively prosperous 
1980s but suffered in the early 1990s when the country was hit by economic recession. 
With the growing economy, trust was restored during the 1990s and the 2000s but de-
clined as a consequence of  the 2008 crash. With the Icelandic economic recovery since 
2010, public trust in politicians also increased between 2009 and 2016. However, the 
growing gap between economic performance and political trust indicates that other fac-
tors may play roles as well.
In a politically stable system, we should expect support for the parties in the gov-
ernment to be a major source of  political trust. This seemed to have been the case in 
Iceland until the crash. The data from the four waves of  the EVS allows us to trace 






1984– 2009/2010 period. Figure 2 shows that citizens who support the political parties 
forming the coalition government generally express more confidence in the parliament 
than those who support the minority parties in the parliament. In the 1984 measure, 
that difference accounted for 19 percentage points, decreasing to 11 points in 1999 and 
increasing again to 14 points in the 2009–2010 measure.
Figure 2. Percentage of respondents reporting confidence in parliament among 
supporters of parties forming the coalition government, supporters of minority 
parties in parliament and all respondents 
Notes. Two questions: Q1. How much confidence do you have in the parliament? Is it ‘a great deal’, ‘quite a lot’, ‘not very 
much’ or ‘none at all’? Figure entries are the percentages of  ‘a great deal’ and ‘quite a lot’. Q2. If  there would be a general 
election tomorrow, which party would you vote for? Variable recoded to ‘parties in the coalition government’ and ‘parties 
not in the coalition government’ (at the time of  the data collection). Sources: Four waves of  European Values Study (EVS), 
1984–2010 – Icelandic data.
The supporters of  the parties in the parliamentary majority tend to have greater confi-
dence in the parliament. The question is what happens to this source of  political trust 
when the party system comes under pressure, which occurred in Iceland in the wake of  
the crash. If  the supporters of  the parties in the government no longer think that the 
government is in control or capable of  channelling their preferences into public policy 
or policy results, this may undermine their trust. Whereas a relatively simple and stable 
party structure with strong majority coalitions contributed to political trust prior to the 
crash, post-crash politics fail to inspire trust in the same manner. The crash was followed 
by overcrowding of  the political agenda, new issue dimensions dividing the government, 
an increasing number of  political alternatives, weaker governing majorities and weaker 
party identification. Hence, we expect identification with parties in the government to 
have lost its power to increase political trust.
One of  the effects of  the crash was reduced identification with the main political 
parties and in particular, weaker identification with the parties in the government. At 
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weaker predictor of  party vote than before. The data from three rounds of  the ESS 
allows us to trace the trends in citizens’ identification with political parties in Iceland 
before and after the 2008 crash (see Figures 3 and 4). 
Figure 3. Percentages of respondents who report feeling closer to a particular 
political party
Notes. Survey question: Is there a particular political party you feel closer to than all the other parties? (yes/no). Sources: 
Second, sixth and eighth rounds of  European Social Survey (ESS) – Icelandic data. 
Figure 4. Percentages of respondents who report feeling close to a political party 
forming the coalition government vs. a minority party in or outside parliament 
Notes. Figure entries are based on the survey question about ‘which party you feel closer to’ and then recoded as ‘parties in 
the coalition government’ and ‘minority parties in or outside parliament’ (at the time of  the data collection). Sources: Second, 
sixth and eighth rounds of  European Social Survey (ESS) – Icelandic data. 
In 2004, 54% of  the respondents in the ESS survey reported feeling closer to one of  
the political parties than others. Of  the respondents identifying with a particular po-






government at that time: the Progressive Party (PP) or the Independence Party (IP). 
In 2012, these figures declined drastically; only 40% of  the respondents felt close to a 
particular party, and merely 36% felt close to one of  the two parties forming the coali-
tion government at that time. This reflected the left-wing government’s (2009–2013) 
failure to maintain its support base inside and outside the parliament. In fact, it had 
become a minority government during the last year of  its term. Support among the vot-
ers had also declined, and in the 2013 parliamentary election, the government suffered 
the greatest electoral defeat in Icelandic political history, as the combined vote shares 
of  the coalition partners dropped from 51.5% in 2009 to 23.8% in 2013. This was not 
because the government was considered to have handled the crisis in an incompetent 
manner. The national election study in 2013 revealed that a convincing majority of  the 
voters believed that the government had handled the crisis well (54%), and only 23% 
thought that the opposition would have done a better job (ICENES 2013). The problem 
that the government encountered was partly the high level of  expectations for which it 
was partly to blame, and partly the complications it encountered as a consequence of  its 
own initiatives on several issues, which considerably complicated the political landscape. 
Thus, the coalition not only promised a Nordic welfare state in Iceland with emphasis 
on protecting the indebted homes but also started major initiatives concerning foreign 
policy, constitutional issues and administrative reforms, for which it lacked political sup-
port, time and policy-making resources to see through to completion. This undermined 
support for the governing parties and encouraged the emergence of  a multitude of  new 
parties since the main opposition parties, the IP and the PP, were too closely associated 
with the crash to be electable to a large group of  voters. Thus, although the IP and the 
PP obtained a comfortable parliamentary majority in the 2013 election, the swing in 
the votes to them (from 38.5% in 2009 to 51.1% in 2013) was much smaller than the 
government’s losses.
The crisis of  the party system has been reflected in the increasing fractionalisation 
and multidimensionality of  political alternatives, making it more difficult for the govern-
ment and the opposition to structure political choices in a coherent manner. They have 
been either internally divided, weak in parliamentary support and exposed to political 
scandal issues, and/or short lived. Although party identification has to some extent 
been re-established since 2012, it is divided into more places and hence not the source 
of  confidence in the government as previously. According to this view, the failure in 
the party system recovery since the 2008 crash is an important reason why confidence 
in politics has not been restored despite a rather successful economic performance. If  
political trust relies partly on the feeling that ‘your people’ are in charge, the failure to 
identify with the governing parties, as well as the governing parties’ failure to signal in a 
non-ambivalent manner that they are in fact in charge, is likely to undermine confidence 
in politics and politicians.
Other factors may play a role as well, however. While perceptions of  general eco-
nomic performance have been shown to affect trust, personal experience may also ex-
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groups can usually be explained by how specific government policies or election out-
comes affect particular social groups, either favourably or unfavourably. Nonetheless, he 
points out that a continuing difference in trust levels among social groups suggests that 
the accumulation of  political inequalities is alienating certain groups from the political 
process. A prime example of  this kind of  process is the difference in political trust levels 
in the United States between African Americans and whites, where African Americans 
have historically been underprivileged and politically marginalised. In the Icelandic case, 
different age cohorts were differently affected by the crash. The 20–49 age group expe-
rienced the greatest difficulties, particularly the 30–39 segment (Ólafsson et al. 2012b). 
In our analysis, we use age as a proxy for personal experience of  the crash. Other back-
ground variables that need to be controlled for include education and gender (Marien 
2008; Mayne & Hakhverdian 2017). However, we start the analysis without strong ex-
pectations regarding the impact of  education and gender.
5. An integrated model
Having made the case that performance and predispositions may contribute to politi-
cal trust, we still lack a more integrated evaluation of  how they may be related and 
how much each factor contributes at any given point in time. Ideally, either large-scale 
comparative data or longitudinal data should be used to put our ideas to the test. Since 
our focus is on Iceland, where longitudinal data is unavailable, we have to settle for less 
satisfactory solutions. In the following subsections, we attempt to evaluate how our de-
pendent variable (political trust) has developed over time on the basis of  a multivariate 
analysis, including perceived economic performance, party identification and key back-
ground variables. 
5.1 Data, measurements and descriptive statistics
The data comes from the second, the sixth and the eighth rounds of  the ESS in Iceland. 
The participants in the three rounds were chosen from a random probability sample, 
and all interviews were conducted face to face. The Social Science Research Institute, 
University of  Iceland collected the data. The ESS 2004 data was collected from May 
to December 2005, the ESS 2012 data from October 2012 to March 2013 and the ESS 
2016 data from November 2016 to June 2017. Table 2 shows further information on the 
sample of  each round.
Table 2. Sample information 
Sample items/rounds ESS 2004 ESS 2012 ESS 2016
Sample size 1,200 1,431 2,002
Response rate % 51 57 46
Male/female % 48/52 50/50 50/50
Age range: years  15–90 15–90 15–94






5.2 The dependent variable
The dependent variable is based on three measures of  political trust in three ESS rounds: 
trust in 1) the country’s parliament, 2) political parties and 3) politicians. The question 
on political trust was phrased as follows: ‘Please tell me on the score of  0 to 10 how 
much you personally trust each of  the institutions I read out. 0 means you don’t trust an 
institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust’. Figure 5 shows the mean scores 
for the three measures of  political trust in the three ESS survey rounds. 
Figure 5. Trust in parliament, politicians and political parties – mean scores (0–10)
Further analysis showed a high correlation among the three questions, indicating that 
they all measured the latent construct. Cronbach’s alpha values for the three items were 
0.90, 0.91 and 0.91 for ESS 2004, ESS 2012 and ESS 2016, respectively. Consequently, an 
index was created as an additive summary of  the three items, which ranged from 0 to 30. 
Table 3 presents the mean scores for the political trust index in every ESS survey round.
5.3 The independent variables 
The three ESS rounds did not have all the same questions in each wave; there were vari-
ations, depending on the focus theme of  each round. Due to our interest in comparing 
the effects of  perceived government performance and political party affiliation across 
the three time points, we could only use measures that were included in all three rounds, 
which limited our options for proxy variables. 
Government performance. Political trust research has shown the important effect of  sub-
jective perceptions of  economic performance on citizens’ evaluations of  institutional 
performance and their political trust (Bok 1997; van der Meer & Dekker 2011). To 
measure government performance, we used the respondents’ reported satisfaction with 
the state of  the country’s economy on an 11-point scale (from 0 = extremely dissatisfied 
to 10 = extremely satisfied). Table 3 shows the mean scores for the performance variable 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics for the continuous variables: mean and standard 
deviation
ESS 2004 ESS 2012 ESS 2016
Political trust index (0–30) 15.76 (5.92) 11.58 (6.20) 13.63 (6.02)
Satisfaction with economy (0–10) 6.27 (2.18) 3.87 (2.20) 5.77 (2.20)
Age 44.5 (17.8) 44.1 (18.7) 48.3 (18.1)
Party identification. The literature theorises about the effects of  voting for the party/
parties in the government on political trust (Holmberg 1999), as well as the effects of  
identifying with the policies of  the party/parties in the government (Miller 1974). We 
decided to use the measure of  feeling closer to a particular party, rather than which party 
the respondents voted for in the last parliamentary elections. This was done to capture 
the respondents’ orientations towards the political parties at the same time as they re-
ported their political trust, since substantial time had passed since the last elections at 
the time of  the data collection (e.g., 3.5–4 years in the case of  ESS 2012). The question 
in the ESS questionnaires used was phrased as follows: “Is there a particular political 
party you feel closer to than all the other parties”. The respondents could answer ‘yes’ 
or ‘no’; those who replied affirmatively were then asked to name the political party to 
which they felt closer. We recoded each answer that cited a political party. The politi-
cal parties that belonged to the coalition government (in the parliamentary majority) at 
the time of  the data collection received code 1. The cited political parties that were not 
part of  the coalition government (in the parliamentary minority or not represented in 
the parliament) at the time of  the data collection received code 0. Table 4 shows the 
percentages of  the respondents who reported feeling closer to parties in the coalition 
government and those feeling closer to parties in the parliamentary minority at the time 
of  the data collection in each of  the three ESS survey rounds. 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics for the categorical variables: percentages of 
respondents
ESS 2004 ESS 2012 ESS 2016
Feeling close to a party in the coalition government 24 13 22
(Feeling close to a party in the parliamentary minority) 26 24 29
Gender: women 52 50 50
Education: university degree 34 27 34
N 579 752 878
Additionally, we control for sociodemographic variables that have been shown to affect 
political trust. For the gender variable, women received code 1, and men received code 0. 
For the education variable, those holding a university degree received code 1, and those 
who had not completed a university education received code 0. The age variable took a 






relationship between the age and the political trust variables, an age-squared variable was 
added. Finally, Table 5 shows the correlation between the dependent variable (the three-
item index on political trust) and all the independent variables.
Table 5. Correlation between the political trust index and the independent 
variables 
ESS 2004 ESS 2012 ESS 2016
Gender (women) Point-Biserial r .01 .12** .09**
N 540 725 860
Age Pearson’s r -.01 -.14** -.07*
N 543 725 864
Education (university degree) Point-Biserial r .03 .12** .19***
N 481 723 855
Satisfaction with state of economy Pearson’s r .35*** .49*** .52***
N 535 718 852
Feeling close to party in government Point-Biserial r .33*** .14* .25***
N 275 271 434
Sign.: p<0.001***; p<0.01**; p<0.05*
6. Results
Table 6 presents estimates from three sets of  linear OLS regression models in the three 
ESS survey rounds. All coefficients in the regression table are standardised betas, al-
lowing comparisons of  the strength of  the independent variables on the political trust 
variable in each survey round.
Table 6. Political trust, OLS regressions
ESS 2004 ESS 2012 ESS 2016
Gender – women .12ˠ .16** .13**
Age .15* -.77* -.84***
Age² .77* .84***
Education – university degree .03 .08 .12**
Satisfaction with present state of economy .33*** .44*** .50***
Feeling close to a party in government .29*** .01 .08ˠ
Constant, sign. value .000 .000 .000
R² adj. .25 .24 .29
N 224 260 421
Notes. Dependent variable is political trust. Entries are standardised parameter estimates of  a linear regression. 
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In the 2004 survey round, ‘satisfaction with the state of  the economy’ (government 
performance) and ‘feeling closer to one of  the parties in the government’ (party identi-
fication) both have a strong positive effect on the political trust variable, 0.33 and 0.29, 
respectively. In the 2012 round, the positive effect of  the performance factor is stronger 
than in the 2004 measures, while the effect of  identifying with the political parties in 
the government has become weak and is not statistically significant. In the 2016 survey, 
the positive impact of  the economic performance factor has become stronger, up to 
0.50. The effect of  identifying with the political parties forming the coalition govern-
ment shows some sign of  rebounding yet remains relatively weak and only statistically 
significant at an alpha level of  0.1. Thus, perceived government performance explains 
levels of  political trust to a much greater extent in the two survey rounds conducted 
after the 2008 economic crash than previously. At the same time, citizens’ identification 
with the political parties in the government as a source of  public confidence in political 
institutions and actors has deteriorated. These results support both of  our expectations. 
Evaluations of  the state of  the economy have a strong predictive value for levels of  
political trust, and identification with the parties in the government is strongly associ-
ated with political trust prior to the 2008 crash but not in the subsequent period. 
The results also show that sociodemographic background matters in explaining the 
development of  political trust in Iceland. Icelandic women express more trust in politi-
cal institutions and actors than Icelandic men do for all the three time points, though 
the gender effect is only statistically significant at an alpha level of  0.1 in the ESS 2004 
round. In the 2004 regression model, the relationship between age and political trust 
is linear; the older generations are more trusting than the younger ones, while educa-
tion does not predict trust levels when controlling for other factors. Intriguingly, these 
relationships change in the post-crash rounds in 2012 and 2016, which indicate a strong 
curvilinear relationship between age and political trust. The youngest and the oldest 
respondents express greater political trust, while those between the ages of  40 and 60 
report the lowest levels of  political trust, according to the estimates. The impact of  
education on political trust is increasing and a significant predictor in the 2016 round; 
citizens who have completed a university degree are more trusting than those with lower 
levels of  education. 
7. Discussion and conclusion  
The 2008 economic crash occurred in the wake of  a rather unique period combining 
political stability and economic prosperity since the mid-1990s. The surprise and the 
severity of  the crash set strong forces in motion, and political trust dwindled rapidly. 
Interestingly and in many respects, the post-crash debate focused more on the political 
aspects of  what went wrong than on the economic ones, and the rapid recovery of  the 
economy was not accompanied by a corresponding return to previous levels of  political 
trust. Our study on the effects of  the crash on political trust in Iceland indicates that 
several factors have an impact on how it develops. Searching for a simple formula for 






trust in some cases but not in others. How performance interacts with other variables 
may be crucial. 
Strong economic performance, accompanied with popular perceptions of  it, had 
likely been an important factor contributing to high levels of  political trust in the pre-
crash period from the mid-1990s. However, rapid economic recovery after the crash 
shows that strong economic performance is not a sufficient condition for a return to 
similar levels of  political trust. Our analysis points to other factors that may play a role. 
One is personal experience, represented by the age variable in our data. Among the age 
groups that are most severely affected by the crisis, we observe a slower return of  politi-
cal trust than among others, mostly the younger and the older cohorts. Thus, despite 
considerable efforts in improving their situation, the generation effect on trust largely 
corresponds to the age cohorts that are most severely weighed down by the debt crisis 
caused by the crash. For these groups, the crisis may have been a critical experience, 
creating a sense of  alienation towards the political forces. 
An even more important influence is the degree of  political disruption accompany-
ing the crash. Prior to the crash, identification with the parties in the government was 
an important source of  confidence in the political system. The crash not only weakened 
the voters’ identification with the established parties but had the additional effect of  
reducing the public feeling of  confidence that politicians were in charge in the govern-
ment. The crash was followed by an increasingly volatile political situation, characterised 
by multidimensionality and problems with creating or maintaining stable government 
coalitions. The analysis indicates that although the effects of  identifying with a party in 
the government have increased to some extent after the crisis receded, they have by no 
means reached the pre-crash levels.
Other variables contribute to trust, including education. With the widening gap be-
tween system performance and trust in politicians, education has increasingly contributed 
to trust in politics. Higher levels of  education may thus, to some extent, counterbalance 
the negative tone of  the debate on politics and politicians. Similarly, gender plays a role; 
women are significantly more trusting of  politicians compared with men. This differ-
ence may to some extent be related to increasingly higher educational levels among 
women, but even in an integrated model, gender continues to exert an influence. There-
fore, the role of  gender remains a subject for future research. 
Based on our study, the key message to policy makers is that although political trust 
was damaged during the crash, it remained close to the European average, even at the 
height of  the crisis, and has been restored to some degree since then. Trust in institu-
tions other than the parliament, such as the civil service, the judiciary and the police, re-
mains comparatively high. Although strong economic performance makes an important 
contribution to political trust, it appears insufficient on its own to bring about full recov-
ery. Important features of  party politics that contribute to political trust, such as party 
identification and support for political parties in the government, do not contribute to 
political trust in the manner that they did prior to the crash. Thus, forging a well-func-
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Note
1  Four waves of  EVS have been conducted in Denmark: in 1981, 1990, 1999 and 2008. Three waves 
of  EVS has been conducted in Finland: in 1990, 2000 and 2009. Three waves of  EVS have been 
conducted in Norway: in 1982, 1990 and 2008. Four waves of  EVS have been conducted in Swe-
den: in 1982, 1990, 1999-2000 and 2009-2010. Source: www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu. It is to be noted that 
the EVS comparison has some shortcomings as the variation of  participating countries increases 
in each successive wave: in terms of  numbers countries, their geographic locations and their type 
of  democracy and political history. The first EVS wave included only 15 countries and one region 
(Northern Ireland), and all of  them fall under the category of  well-established democracies of  
Western Europe and North America. In the second wave in 1990 many of  the transition countries 
of  Central and Eastern Europe came in and the third wave in 1999 to 2000 saw a further extension 
east and to the Balkan states. In the fourth wave, 2008-2010, 47 countries and one region (Northern 
Ireland) took part, from all parts of  Europe as well as three countries from the Caucasus region. 
Thus, a comparison of  the EVS average scores between sequential waves should be done with cau-
tion because the variation in the number and characteristics of  the participating countries increases 
with each wave.
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